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           Abstract
This paper develops extensive new data on the legal independence of new central banks in 26
former socialist economies (FSE).  This data is constructed using the codification system for
measuring legal independence developed in Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and in chapter 19
of Cukierman (1992).  This makes it comparable with earlier data on central bank independence
(CBI) in the industrial democracies and in, non FSE, developing countries and permits
experimentation with alternative indices of CBI like those reviewed in Eijffinger and van Keulen
(1995). 
The new indices of independence indicate that central bank (CB) reform in the FSE during
the nineties has been quite ambitious.  In spite of the large price shocks induced by the transformation
from plan to market, reformers in those countries chose to create central banks with levels of legal
independence that are substantially higher, on average, than those of developed economies during the
eighties. 
Based on data from 1989 through 1998 the evidence in the paper suggests that CBI is
unrelated to inflation during the early stages of  liberalization.  But for sufficiently high and sustained
levels of liberalization, and controlling for variables like price decontrols and wars, legal CBI and
inflation are significantly and negatively related.  These findings are consistent with the view that legal
CBI, no matter how high,  cannot contain the powerful inflationary impact of wide scale liberalization
of formerly controlled prices.  But once the process of liberalization has gathered sufficient
momentum  legal independence becomes effective in slowing inflation down and the cumulative
liberalization index developed by de Melo et. al. (1996) becomes relatively less important. 
The paper also presents evidence on factors that affect the level of CBI and examines the
relation between inflation and CBI within a broader sample composed of the transition and of the
developed economies.
JEL Classification: E5, P2, K1, P16,
Keywords : Central Banks, Legal Independence, Transition Economies, Inflation, Reform.
An informative overall summary of the evolution of inflation in FSE appears in Stern2
(1996).
Early evidence on inflation and CBI appears in Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991),3
Cukierman (1992), Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993). 
Recent surveys of this and later work are Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) and Cukierman (1998).
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1.  Introduction
The, still ongoing, process of transition from plan to market in the former socialist economies
(FSE) involves a fundamental process of change in the structure of those economies.  In their attempt
to create the institutional infrastructure needed for a market economy governments of the FSE
scrapped old institutions and replaced them with new ones that were often patterned after similar
institutions in the Western democracies.  
One element of this process was the creation of a Western type central bank (CB).  Practically
all FSE either created a totally new CB by breaking the, typically socialist, Monobank into a CB and
a private banking system or, in the case of several Central and East European (CEE) countries,
substantially upgraded the legal independence of their preexisting central banks.  Within a span of
eight years (1991 - 1998) all FSE created completely new CB laws, or reformed existing laws, at
least once and sometimes even twice.  Although there are substantial cross country variations among
these new CB laws practically all of them embody substantially higher levels of independence than
was the case in the pre-reform period.  
Prior to, and in some cases after, the enactment of the CB law most transition economies
experienced high and variable inflation.  In some cases those inflationary episodes even assumed
hyperinflationary dimensions.   The conjunction of high inflation and of CB reform provides a unique2
opportunity to examine the relationship between inflation and central bank independence (CBI) in
environments with major structural changes and high inflation
This paper has two major purposes.  The first is to document and quantify the cross sectional
and over time variation in the level of legal central bank independence (CBI) in transition economies
in a manner that allows systematic comparisons with the independence of central banks in more
mature market economies.  The second is to examine whether higher legal CBI is  associated with
lower inflation as is the case in developed economies.    This negative association between inflation3
Such deviations led Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992), Cukierman (1992, chapters 194
and 20), Cukierman and Webb (1995), de Haan and Van’t Hag (1995) and de Haan and Kooi
(1998) to use behavioral proxies of CBI such as the turnover of CB governors and their political
vulnerability. 
See also Neyapti (1997).  Radzyner and Riesinger (1997) contains an informative5
discussion of legal and of actual independence in 5 CEE.  Related work on various small subsets
of FSE appears in Hochreiter (1994), Hochreiter and Riesinger (1995) and in Hochreiter, Rovelli
and Winckler (1996).
Except for Bosnia-Herzegovina and (contemporary) Yugoslavia this is practically the6
entire universe of FSE.
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and legal independence is not obvious apriori for several reasons.  First, as is the case in non FSE
developing countries, legal independence may be a poor proxy for actual independence because of
substantial deviations between actual practice and the law.   Second, although CBI may be negatively4
associated with inflation in relatively stable Western democracies it may not be sufficient to contain
the inflationary temptations that arise in the presence of large price shocks such as those that are
induced by price decontrols and armed conflicts.  
A recent study by de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996) reports that inflation is lower in
transition economies with a higher level of sustained liberalization.  A third purpose of the paper is
to examine the relative contributions, if any, of liberalization and of legal CBI to the abatement of
inflation. 
To this point there has been little systematic work on measuring legal CBI and its relation to
inflation in the FSE.  Two exceptions are the recent work of Lougani and Sheets (1997) who
construct an index of legal independence for twelve FSE and relate it to the rate of inflation in those
countries in 1993 and Neyapti (2000) who develops similar data for a sample of eight Central and
East European countries between 1989 and 1996.   This paper extends both samples along several5
dimensions.  First, it includes 26 FSE and considers the association between inflation and CBI over
the entire period between 1989 and 1998.   Second, it provides indices for the detailed features of6
the new laws that are based on the codification system in Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and
in Chapter 19 of Cukierman (1992).  This makes it possible to compare the level of independence of
the newly created central banks with that of more established central banks in the world and to
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experiment with several alternative measures of independence.
The indices of independence developed in this paper reveal that the legal independence of
newly created CB in the FSE is higher than that of central banks in developed economies during the
eighties.  In particular, at least eight of the newly created central banks possess levels of aggregate
legal independence which exceed that of the highly independent Bundesbank during the 1980's.  The
evidence in the paper also shows that inflation and legal independence are negatively related but only
above a sufficiently high threshold level of sustained liberalization.  Below this threshold inflation is
unrelated to legal independence.  This  confirms, for a wider sample of countries and of periods, the
finding of Lougani and Sheets (1997) and of Neyapti (2000) that inflation and CBI are negatively
related subject to the important qualification above regarding the existence of a threshold degree of
cumulative liberalization.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the methods used to construct detailed
and aggregate indices of legal independence.  It also presents the indices and puts them within an
international perspective.  Controlling for wars and the extent of sustained liberalization section 3
presents preliminary evidence on the relation between  inflation  and several aggregate indices of legal
independence.  The sample consists of a pooled cross section time series comprising three broad time
periods;  The period prior to the enactment of the first CB law, the period after the enactment of the
last CB law and, for eight countries, a period between the enactment of a first and a second CB law.
The main finding is that legal independence and inflation are unrelated.   
Section 4 takes a deeper look at this lack of association by also controlling for the temporary,
but powerful, inflationary shocks induced by price decontrols and by allowing for the potential
existence of an interaction between legal independence and sustained liberalization.  The main finding
is that the familiar, from developed economies, negative relation between inflation and legal
independence appears also in the transition economies, but only after the process of sustained
liberalization crosses a certain threshold. Section 5 examines the relationship between inflation and
legal independence in a wider sample that includes the transition countries and the developed
economies.  Section 6 tests empirically several hypotheses about possible determinants of legal CB
independence.  This is followed by concluding remarks. 
    
A systematic comparison between the different indices appears in Eijffinger and van7
Keulen (1995).
The index LVAW is obtained via a two rounds judgmental aggregation procedure in the8
first of which sixteen various features of legal independence are aggregated into eight subgroups. 
Those eight subgroups are then further aggregated to obtain the index LVAW. The weights used
in the second and last round of aggregation are; appointment and dismissal procedures and term
of office of the governor -- 0.20; location of authority over monetary policy, CB objectives and
severity of limitations on advances to government --0.15 each; limitations on securitized lending,
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2.  The Measurement of Legal CBI in Economies in Transition
There are, by now, several alternative indices of legal CBI.  The most comprehensive of those
is the index in Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) or in chapter 19 of Cukierman (1992).  This
index is based on a coding of sixteen different characteristics of CB charters that pertain to the
allocation of authority over monetary policy, procedures for resolution of conflicts between the CB
and government, the relative importance of price stability in CB objectives as stated in the law, the
seriousness of limitations on lending by the CB to government, and procedures for the appointment
and dismissal of the governor of the CB.  Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) present a weighted
index of those sixteen characteristics (LVAW) and Cukierman (1992) presents an unweighted version
of the same characteristics (LVAU).   
Other indices, as those used by Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988,1989), Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) can, for the most part, be
approximated by subsets of the components of the LVAW (or of the LVAU) index.   We therefore7
code the legal independence of new CB laws in FSE in terms of the sixteen components underlying
the LVAW and the LVAU indices.  This has two advantages.  First, given those sixteen
characteristics, it is possible to perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the other indices by using
appropriate subsets of those characteristics.  Second the LVAW index exists for a wide number of
countries during the forty years preceding the breakdown of Communism.  The coding of CBI in
transition economies in terms of this index allows, therefore, a wide range of international
comparisons of legal independence. 
The sixteen basic variables underlying the aggregate index LVAW and the references
describing the conventions for their coding appear in table A1 of the Appendix.   Each variable is8
location of decision about CB lending and other miscalleneous feature of limitations on lending --
0.10 each; and the width of the circle of potential borrowers from the CB -- 0.05. The indices
LVAU and LVAW are highly correlated.  Further detail appears in section 19.3 of Cukierman
(1992).    
The weights used are 0.4, 0.4 and 0.2 respectively.  This, relatively narrow index follows9
the spirit of Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and of Eijffinger and van Keulen (1995) who claim that
those characteristics of legal independence are far more important for inflation than all the rest. 
This aggregate “legal limitations on lending” variable is a weighted average of eight10
different variables that pertain to the tightness of legal limitations on lending by the CB to
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coded on a scale between 0 and 1 where 0 stands for the minimal level of independence and 1 for the
maximal level.  Our sample consists of twenty six countries that include all the countries that broke
off from the former Soviet Union (FSU), Mongolia, and  all the former socialist CEE countries except
Bosnia and contemporary Yugoslavia.  Table 1 shows (in the last three columns) alternative
aggregate indices of legal CBI for those countries.  In addition the second and third columns show
the year(s) of enactment of the CB law(s) and, when relevant,  the year of replacement of the Ruble
by a domestic currency respectively.  In eight countries there were two CB reforms.  In such cases
the country holds two rows, each with a different enactment year where the first row stands for the
first CB law enacted in that country and the second row for the second CB law. 
In some FSU countries like Lithuania and Moldova the Ruble continued  to circulate for some
time after the enactment of the first CB law so that this law was not effective prior to the replacement
of the Ruble by a domestic currency.  Hence, in order to evaluate the impact of CB independence on
inflation it is important to keep track of both the year of enactment of the law  as well as of the year
of replacement of the Ruble. This is the motivation for the appearance of the second and third
columns.
The table shows the aggregate index LVAW as well as two narrower indices labeled LVES
and LVESX respectively.  The first index assigns positive weights only to the allocation of authority
for monetary policy, the procedures for resolution of conflicts between government and the CB, and
the degree of relative focus on price stability as prescribed by the law.   LVESX is a weighted average9
of the narrow LVES index and of the subaggregate of all limitations on lending by the CB to
government from Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) with weights of 0.6 and 0.4 respectively.10
government.  The relative magnitudes of the weights are the same as those in table 19.2 (page
380) of Cukierman (1992).  The correlation coefficients between LVAW and each of the
following :LVES, LVESX are 0.92 and 0.90 respectively. The correlation between LVES and
LVESX is 0.96.  
The relatively high level of legal independence in Belarus is practically irrelevant for11
inflation in this country since, during the entire sample period, Belarus continued to use the
Russian Ruble.
Chapter 19 of Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).12
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It is calculated directly from the individual components in table A1 of the appendix.  
Among the CB laws exhibiting the highest levels of independence are those of Estonia, the
Czech Republic, Belarus, and the latest laws of Lithuania, Armenia, Moldova and Poland.   The last11
four laws have been enacted between 1995 and 1997.  Why did those countries choose such
high levels of independence ?  This is a question that concerns the sociology and politics  of institution
formation.  Section 6 below offers a tentative discussion as well as preliminary evidence. 
Late comers to the circle of CB reformers generally tend to enact laws with higher levels of
independence.  This feature is particularly striking in countries that had more than one CB reform like
Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland and Mongolia.  In all those cases the
level of independence of the second law is higher than that of the first law, and frequently, by a lot.
The figures at the bottom of table 1 illustrate the average magnitude of this phenomenon.  
It is noteworthy that, in addition, the average level of independence of the first law in
countries with two CB reforms is lower than the average level of independence in the entire sample
but that their second laws embody a significantly higher level of independence than that of the sample
average.  Essentially, countries that had two CB reforms initially granted less than average
independence to their central banks' but were then led to reconsider their positions. Once the
authorities of those countries decided to have a second reform they went farther in terms of legal
independence than countries that had only one CB reform.  
The general trend in CB legislation illustrated by table 1 is particularly dramatic in view of the
fact that during the forty years ending in 1989 there were very few changes in CB legislation.   It12
appears, therefore, that the international monetary policy consensus during recent years has been
shifting vigorously towards consideration of CBI as a highly desirable institutional feature.  This
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Table 1 : Aggregate Legal Independence in Transition Economies after CB           
Reform and Year of Removal of the Ruble
Country enactment
year            






Albania  92 0.51 0.47 0.49
Armenia 93 93 0.30 0.60 0.34
Armenia 96 93 0.85 1.00 0.90
Azerbaijan 92 93 0.22 NA 0.42
Azerbaijan 96 93 0.25 NA 0.32
Belarus 92 still in use
in 2000
0.73 0.75 0.67
Bulgaria 91 0.55 NA 0.65
Croatia 92 0.44 0.60 0.49
Czech Republic 91 0.73 0.96 0.73
Estonia 93 92 0.78 0.96 0.58
Georgia 95 93 0.73 0.68 0.62
Hungary 91 0.67 0.79 0.61
Kazakhstan 93 93 0.32 0.63 0.56
Kazakhstan 95 93 0.44 0.92 0.79
Kyrgyz Republic 92 93 0.52 0.55 0.55
Latvia 92 92 0.49 0.96 0.73
Lithuania 91 92 0.28 0.37 0.25
Lithuania 96 0.78 0.96 0.58
Macedonia 95 0.41 0.68 0.55
Moldova 91 93 0.38 0.84 0.54
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Moldova 95 0.73 0.96 0.94
Mongolia 91 0.43 0.96 0.61
Mongolia 96 0.55 0.92 0.68
Poland 91 0.46 0.49 0.32
Polandd 97 0.89 0.92 0.95
Romania 91 0.34 0.51 0.32
Russia 95 0.49 0.47 0.38
Slovak Republic 92 0.62 0.92 0.73
Slovenia 91 0.63 0.72 0.52
Tajikistan 93 95 0.36 NA 0.29
Turkmenistan 92 93 0.26 0.25 0.19
Ukraine b 91 93 0.42 NA NA
Uzbekistan 91c 94 0.41 NA 0.71
Uzbekistan 95 94 0.56 0.92 0.92
Average 0.52 0.74 0.57
 Countries with two CB reforms - averages:  
First law   0.35                0.65              0.47
Second law   0.63                0.94              0.76
Notes:  For obvious reasons this year is shown only for countries that used to be part of the formera 
Soviet Union.
 No aggregate index of legal independence is shown for Ukraine in line with our rule not tob 
display such an index when the sum of weights of the legal variables for which there is a meaningful
entry is less than 0.7.  As can be seen from Appendix table A1 data on some of the legal variables in
Ukraine is available.  Had we calculated an aggregate index from this small set of legal variables we
would have obtained an aggregate index showing relatively high independence. 
Tentative date.c
All the limitation on lending variables underlying the 1997 aggregate index for the Bank ofd
Poland are set to 1.00 because the 1997 Polish constitution prohibits government from borrowing at
the CB.  Further details and discussion appear in the second footnote to table A1 in the appendix, in
Wojtyna (1997) and in Huterski et. al. (1999).
Since 1989 a number of developed economies (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain13
New-Zealand and the UK) have upgraded legal CBI (Cukierman (1998)).  It is likely that even if
those changes are taken into consideration average legal independence of central banks in
transition economies will remain higher than that of developed economies.   
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conclusion is reenforced by the international comparison of legal independence presented in the
following subsection.
2.1  The legal independence of new central banks in transition economies - an international
perspective
This subsection compares the legal independence embedded in the (latest) CB laws in
transition economies with that of developed economies during the decade of the eighties.  The most
striking fact is that, on average, aggregate legal independence of new central banks in transition
economies is substantially higher than CBI in developed economies during the eighties.  This
conclusion is robust to the type of aggregate index used.  For example, the average value of LVAW
is 0.52 in transition economies and is merely 0.36 in developed economies.  Similarly, the average
value of LVES is a whopping 0.74 in transition economies against 0.29 in developed economies.13
Table 2 presents a  common ranking of both groups of countries for the LVAW and the LVES 
indices.  For the first index the eight countries with the highest scores are all transition economies,
followed by high independence countries among developed nations like Germany and Switzerland.
For the second index the first 10 countries with the highest score are all transition economies.  The
immediately following entries down the ranking are largely taken, again, by the central banks of
countries in transition.    
It is evident from the table that, sometimes amidst high inflation, political authorities in
transition economies made significant efforts to create central banks with high legal independence by
international standards.  This raises two, possibly related, questions.  First, does the difference in legal
independence between the two groups of countries reflect a similar difference in actual CBI ? Second,
why did the political authorities of transition economies rush to delegate so much legal independence
to their central banks ?  Our feeling with respect to the first question is that the difference in legal
independence between the two groups of countries exaggerates the relative actual independence of
11
Table 2 : A Comparison of the New Legal Independence in Transition Economies and          
in Developed Economies During the Eighties
A.  Ranked by LVAW a
Country LVAW Country LVAW Country LVAW
Poland 0.89 Bulgaria 0.55 Iceland 0.34
Armenia 0.85 Kyrgyz Republic 0.52 Romania 0.34
Estonia 0.78 Albania 0.51 Luxemburg 0.33
Lithuania 0.78 Denmark 0.50 Sweden 0.29
Georgia 0.73 Latvia 0.49 Finland 0.28
Moldova 0.73 Russia 0.49 UK 0.27
Belarus 0.73 USA 0.48 Turkmenistan 0.26
Czech Republic 0.73 Canada 0.45 Azerbaijan 0.25
Germany 0.69 Croatia 0.44 Italy 0.25
Hungary 0.67 Ireland 0.44 France 0.24
Switzerland 0.64 Kazakhstan 0.44 New - Zealand 0.24
Slovenia 0.63 Netherlands 0.42 Spain 0.23
Slovak Republic 0.62 Ukraine 0.42 Japan 0.18
Austria 0.61 Macedonia 0.41 Belgium 0.17
Uzbekistan 0.56 Australia 0.36 Norway 0.17
Mongolia 0.55 Tajikistan 0.36
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Table 2 : Continued                                                    
B.  Ranked by LVESa
Country LVES Country LVES Country LVES
Armenia 1.00 Macedonia 0.68 Turkmenistan 0.25
Estonia 0.96 Croatia 0.60 Norway 0.21
Latvia 0.96 Kyrgyz Republic 0.55 Finland 0.16
Lithuania 0.96 Denmark 0.52 Ireland 0.16
Moldova 0.96 Romania 0.51 USA 0.16
Czech Republic 0.96 France 0.51 Belgium 0.08
Poland 0.92 Russia 0.47 New -Zealand 0.08
Kazakhstan 0.92 Albania 0.47 Italy 0.04
Mongolia 0.92 Switzerland 0.40 Sweden 0.04
Slovak Republic 0.92 Netherlands 0.37 UK 0.04
Germany 0.87 Australia 0.29 Azerbaijan NA
Hungary 0.79 Iceland 0.29 Tajikistan NA
Austria 0.76 Japan 0.27 Ukraine NA
Belarus 0.75 Canada 0.25 Uzbekistan NA
Slovenia 0.72 Luxemburg 0.25 Bulgaria NA
Georgia 0.68 Spain 0.25
 In countries with two CB reforms the latest of the two laws is used.a
NA means that there is not enough information to calculate the index.  We followed the rule of not
reporting an aggregate index whenever information on more than 30 percent of the  (weighted)
constituent components was missing. 
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transition economies, particularly during the early stages of transition from planned to market 
economies.  One reason is that the translation of legal independence into actual independence depends
on the general regard for the law which is likely to be higher in developed economies with a long
democratic and free markets tradition than in the newly created transition democracies.  But as the
process of sustained liberalization persists and gathers momentum it is likely that this relative bias
shrinks.  We return to this issue in subsection 4.3 below.
As to the second question an important consideration is the realization on the part of
policymakers in the FSE that CBI can substantially enlarge the, initially rather limited, access of their
countries to international capital markets.  In the world of the nineties CBI is a stamp of economic
respectability and for some countries even a prerequisite for access to those markets. It is also likely
that the success of the Bundesbank in maintaining price stability and the increasing professional
consensus that CBI is conducive to price stability played a role.  
3.  Legal Independence and Post Enactment Inflation - A First Look
Most existing studies on inflation and CBI in developed and developing countries  excluding
the transition economies are basically cross sectional. This purely cross sectional focus is dictated by
the absence of meaningful temporal variation in existing measures of legal CBI. But in the case of
transition economies there were, during the early nineties, dramatic changes in CBI within all the
countries  concerned.  In many cases new central banks were created from scratch and were granted,
as we saw in section 2, substantial levels of legal independence.
Did the enactment of new CB laws have a noticeable effect on inflation, and was the decrease
in inflation bigger in countries that experienced a larger increase in the legal independence of their CB?
Those questions can be answered empirically by utilizing the over time variation, as well as the cross
country variation in legal independence.  For that purpose we divided the sample, for most countries,
into two broad periods.  A preenactment period and a post enactment period.  For countries that had
two CB reforms, the sample was divided into three subperiods.  The period prior to (and including the
year of ) the first enactment, the period after the first enactment up to and including the year of the
second one, and the period after the enactment of the last CB law.  
In some of the FSU countries like Lithuania, Moldova and Tajikistan the first CB law was
An informative discussion of the process of replacement of the Ruble by domestic14
currencies appears in Melliss and Cornelius (1994) and Conway  (1995). 
Russia had only one CB reform which took place in 1995 so there is data for this country15
only for the first and the third periods (see table A4). Accordingly the level of CBI for Russia in
its first period (which ends and includes 1995) is taken to be zero.  Legal CBI in Russia in effect
during the third period is determined by the parameters of the 1995 law.  Since Belarus has been
using the Russian Ruble throughout our entire sample period its level of legal independence is
taken to be the same as that of Russia in spite of the fact that Belarus had a CB reform in 1992.
Finally, since it replaced the Ruble by a domestic currency only in 1995 the level of independence
in Taijikistan is taken to be the same as that of Russia until and including 1995. 
Those countries are Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. 16
Experimentation with the alternative assumption that in all those countries preenactment legal
independence was the same as the highest level of legal independence for the CEE countries for
which there is preenactment data did not materially affect the nature of the results.
14
enacted prior to the replacement of the Ruble by a domestic currency.   As a result, the new CB law14
did not become effective until the time of replacement of the Ruble by a domestic currency.  In such
cases the last year of the first period is taken to be the latest of the year of enactment of the CB law
and of the year of replacement of the Ruble by a domestic currency.  We thus obtain a pooled cross
section - time series sample with, at most, 3 periods for each country.
Aggregate legal independence after the enactment of either the first or the second CB law is
taken from table 1.  Prior to the first enactment or the replacement of the Ruble by a domestic
currency (whichever comes later) it is characterized as zero for all the countries that broke off from
the former Soviet Union as well as for Mongolia.   Data on preenactment CBI for Hungary, Poland,15
Romania and countries that broke off from the former Yugoslavia is the same as the legal
independence in those countries during the eighties and is constructed from data in Cukierman, Webb
and Neyapti (1992) or in chapter 19 of Cukierman (1992).  For the remaining CEE countries, for
which there is no data, it is taken to be zero.   Characterization of preenactment CBI as zero for16
countries that broke off from the former Soviet Union is natural in view of the fact that there was no
separate CB in the Soviet Union.  Admittedly, there was a Monobank (the Gosbank) but its function
was to finance the transactions that were implied by the central plan rather than to function as a CB
in the Western sense.  
Inflation is characterized by the rate of depreciation in the real value of money (D) which is
For example when inflation is one hundred percent the rate of depreciation in the real17
value of money is only fifty percent.
Our expectation is that, to the extent that a change in legal independence affects18
inflation, it does so with a lag.
 I measures the extent of liberalization of domestic prices and abolition of state trading19
monopolies, E measures the degree of liberalization of the foreign trade regime including the
extent of currency convertibility and P measures the extent of enterprise privatization and of
banking reform.  As is the case with the aggregate liberalization index each of those indices is
bounded between zero and one.  The yearly values of CLI appear in appendix table A3.
15
naturally bounded between zero and one.  This measure has two advantages over the rate of inflation.
First it diminishes the influence of outliers.  This is an important consideration in a sample of countries
with wide variations in inflation, as is the case here.  Second, D is a more meaningful measure of the
impact of inflation on individuals than the rate of inflation.  This consideration is not important at low
rates of inflation since at low rates the divergence between the two measures is negligible.  But at high
rates, of the kind that have been experienced by a good number of countries in our sample, the
divergence becomes significant.   D in year t is calculated from data on inflation using the relation D17
= F / (1 + F) where F is the average rate of inflation between year t-1 and year t.  Data on average
yearly inflation is obtained from various issues of the EBRD Transition Report and Update (data and
detailed references appear in table A2 of the appendix).  
The rate of depreciation in the real value of money within each subperiod is taken as a simple
yearly average within the subperiod. Since the year of enactment is, by construction, included in the
pre-enactment period of the (appropriate) CB law there is a lag between the average value of D in a
subperiod and the time at which the CB law in effect in that subperiod became effective.18
de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996) have recently developed a wide ranging index of
liberalization for transition economies.  Their work suggests that inflation is negatively related to the
cumulative degree of liberalization of the economy (CLI).  The cumulative degree of liberalization in
a given year is defined as a simple sum of the degrees of liberalization (LI) up to and including the
current year.  The  yearly liberalization index is, in turn, a weighted average (with weights of 0.3, 0.3
and 0.4) of the degrees of liberalization in the following areas : internal markets (I), external markets
(E) and private sector entry (P).19
When the number of years in a subperiod is even CLI for the subperiod is characterized20
by the mean value of CLI in the two years in the middle of that subperiod.
See for examples Barro (1979), Chapter 15 of Barro (1984) and Roubini and Sachs21
(1989).
A consequence of this classification is that all the periods for Macedonia are classified as22
"no war" periods since the 1991 armed conflict in that country was very brief. 
Further discussion of this issue appears later.23
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The rationale for using a cumulative, rather than a yearly , index of liberalization is that at any
given time economic performance is affected by the degree of liberalization at that time, as well as by
the length of time that particular reforms have been in effect.  When looking for a potential relationship
between inflation and legal CBI it is therefore natural to control for the cumulative degree of
liberalization.  We measure the degree of cumulative liberalization within a subperiod as the value of
CLI at the median year within the subperiod.   20
Eight out of the twenty six countries in the sample were involved in regional conflicts for at
least part of the time span of our sample.  Those countries are Croatia, Slovenia, Armenia, Georgia,
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Macedonia.  Both theory and evidence suggest that deficits and
inflationary finance are higher during wars.   To account for possible effects of war on inflation we21
construct a war dummy (WD) that assumes a value of one in those countries-periods in which the
country was at war for more than half of the time during the period (1, 2 or 3) and zero otherwise.22
The three periods data matrix used in this section is summarized in table A4 of the appendix.  
It is likely that, even if it has any impact on inflation, CB reform operates with a lag.  Higher
independence is likely to affect policy choices with some lag and those choices impact the economy
with an additional lag.  The construction of periods in our sample builds in a lag by including the year
of enactment of a CB reform in the period that precedes this reform.  As a consequence the average
rate of depreciation in the real value of money in a country during any given subperiod is automatically
related to the level of CBI that became effective at least one year in the past.  This procedure also
reduces the risk of simultaneity bias due to possible reverse causality from inflation to legal CBI.   23
Table 3 reports various regressions of D on CLI, the war dummy and the three aggregate
indices of legal CBI from table 1.  The table confirms the de Melo et. al. (1996) result that inflation
17
Table 3 : Inflation, CBI, cumulative liberalization and wars a
Dependent variable : D
Regressors :
CLI -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(0.06) (0.10) (0.01)








Intercept 0.45 0.44 0.42
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adj. R- sq 0.33 0.36 0.33
Number of observations  57 51 56
 
_________________
 Numbers in parenthesis under the coefficients are levels of significance. a
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is significantly lower the higher and the more persistent is the degree of liberalization as measured by
the variable CLI and reveals a positive and significant influence of war on inflation.  But the impact
of all three indices of CBI on inflation is insignificant.  
Should we conclude from those preliminary results that CB reform in the transition economies
did not have any desirable effect on inflation?  It is argued in the next section that reaching such a
conclusion solely on the basis of this evidence is likely to be premature.
4.  Accounting for the Inflationary Impact of Domestic Price
Liberalization and of Interactions between Central Bank Reform and
Liberalization 
4.1   Effect of domestic price liberalization
The process of decontrol of domestic prices produced sizable temporary non monetary jumps
in the rate of inflation of many transition economies as prices of domestic goods were allowed to
adjust  towards market values.  Central Bank reform was often introduced just prior to, or
concurrently with, the liberalization of domestic prices. It is likely that in such cases CBI could not
contain the temporary impact of price decontrol on the measured rate of inflation.  Even if substantial,
CBI alone is insufficient to contain the, temporary but powerful, price level adjustments that are
essential to the process of liberalization of internal prices.  It is therefore possible, in principle, that in
spite of the fact that legal CBI does have a negative impact on inflation in the transition countries, this
effect is not detected by the regressions in table 3 because of the price shocks created by the process
of decontrol of domestic prices.
To examine this possibility we add the index of liberalization of internal prices, I, from
de Melo et. al. (1996) to the regressions in table 3.  Within each subperiod the value of I is taken as
its value in the median year(s) of the subperiod.  The results appear in table 4.  It is apparent from the
table that this variable has a positive and highly significant effect on inflation, and that its addition leads
to an increase in the overall explanatory power of all the regressions as characterized by the adjusted
R-squared.  The coefficients of all  four  alternative measures of aggregate legal independence are still
insignificant.  As in table 3 the index of cumulative liberalization is still negative and significant and
19
Table 4 : Inflation, CBI, liberalization, wars and decontrols of domestic prices  a
Dependent variable : D
Regressors :
CLI -0.09 -0.08 -0.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I 0.33 0.35 0.34
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)








Intercept 0.37 0.36 0.36
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adj. R- sq 0.39 0.45 0.40
Number of observations   57 51 56
_________________
 Numbers in parenthesis under the coefficients are levels of significance. a
           
Technically a dummy variable that assumes the value of one when CLI > 2.0 and the24
value of zero otherwise is defined.  It is then used to create an additional variable that is defined
as the product of the (appropriate) aggregate legal independence index and the previously defined
dummy. The cutoff of 2.0 is chosen so as to leave a similar number of observations on both sides
of the cutoff. 
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the war dummy is still positive and significant.  
The general picture that emerges from table 4 leads to the conclusion that the process of
decontrol of domestic prices has a powerful positive impact on measured inflation and that, to this
point, there is no evidence to support conventional wisdom regarding the negative relation between
inflation and legal CBI.
4.2  Interaction between CB reform and cumulative liberalization
A possible reason for the lack of evidence in favor of a negative relation between inflation and
legal independence is that such independence is instrumental in reducing inflation only when other
structural features of the economy have become sufficiently and persistently similar to those of
developed market economies.  A fuller discussion of why this might be the case appears in subsection
4.3 below.  To examine this possibility we reestimate the regressions in table 4 with a slope dummy
at high values of the cumulative liberalization index.   The slope dummy is meant to allow the24
detection of an interaction between the effects of independence and of liberalization on  inflation if
such interaction exists. The slope dummy measures the additional effect of legal independence on
inflation when the cumulative liberalization index is higher than 2.0. 
The most striking result of table 5 is that the slope dummy is negative and highly significant
pointing to the existence of a substantial interaction between the effects of cumulative liberalization
and of CBI on inflation.  The coefficients of CBI at low levels of cumulative liberalization remain
insignificant and the coefficient of CLI  (which was significant before) becomes insignificant at
conventional levels, but its sign remains negative.  Finally, the impacts of the war dummy and of (a
concave transformation -- denoted I1 of) the index of liberalization of domestic prices on inflation
remain positive and significant. In table 5 we have used the concave transformation, I1, of the index
of domestic price liberalization, instead of the index I itself, to allow for the possibility that the
inflationary impact of domestic price decontrols is higher during the earlier than during the later stages
21
Table 5 : Inflation, CBI, liberalization, wars and domestic price decontrols with an interaction
effect (cutoff for slope dummy: CLI=2.0) a
Dependent variable : D
Regressors :
CLI -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
(0.24) (0.15) (0.11)
I1 0.17 0.24 0.23
(0.11) (0.02) (0.03)








Addition to coefficient -0.63 -0.27 -0.35
of CBI in range CLI>2.0 (0.01) (0.13) (0.04)
Intercept 0.35 0.34 0.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adj. R- sq 0.48 0.48 0.46
Number of observations   57 51 56
_________________
 Numbers in parenthesis under the coefficients are levels of significance. a
I1 is a continuous concave function of I which has the same mean value and the same25
slope at the mean value of I (this slope is one, since I as a function of itself is a 45 degrees line) as
I itself.  The precise functional form is: I1=1.618 - [1 / (0.618 + I)] and it is restricted to the [0,1]
range since the index I is defined only for this range.  I=I1=0 means that the process of price
decontrols has not started and  I=I1=1 means that all domestic prices are fully liberalized. 
22
of price decontrols.   We chose to present a version of table 5 which utilizes the concave25
transformation, I1, rather than the original index, I, because the goodness of fit of the regressions in
the first case is better.  Except for this difference in goodness of fit the two sets of regressions yield
similar qualitative results. 
4.3  Summary and discussion 
 The main conclusion from tables 4 and 5 is that the negative relation between legal
independence and inflation found in Western Democracies also appears in the FSE but only at
sufficiently high levels of sustained liberalization.  At low levels of sustained liberalization legal CBI
has no impact on inflation while cumulative liberalization does have a strong negative impact. By
contrast, at high levels of cumulative liberalization CBI has a strong negative impact on inflation  and
the (still negative) impact of CLI on inflation becomes insignificant.  
At first blush this finding may appear surprising.  Why should CBI be more effective in
containing inflation at higher than at lower levels of cumulative liberalization?  A possible reason is
that at high levels of sustained liberalization general compliance with the law, including in particular
the CB law is higher.  As a consequence, for any given level of legal independence, the effective level
of independence is higher the higher the level of sustained liberalization.  
This begs the question of why  compliance with the law should be higher in countries with
higher levels of sustained liberalization.  A possible reason is that the importance of law abidance for
the orderly functioning of the economy and of the political system increases with the degree of
sustained liberalization.  This notion can be illustrated by considering the polar cases of a pure market
economy and of a command economy.  Law abidance is important for stopping a market economy
from deteriorating into chaos by setting and enforcing clear rules of the game in order to limit
opportunistic behavior by a  large mass of independent agents.  By contrast in a command economy,
since the freedom of action of most agents is severely limited in the first place, law abidance is not as
essential.   
The countries in their sample are : Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,26
Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.  They construct
an index of legal independence from more basic data collected by Hinton-Braaten (1994) and
Lewarne (1995).
This is due to data limitations.27
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A further look at table 5 reveals that the coefficient of the aggregate index LVESX -- which
assigns positive weights to variables that characterize the severity of limitations on lending to
government -- is larger and somewhat more significant than the aggregate index LVES which does
not take the impact of  such limitations into consideration.  This finding supports the view that, once
there is sufficient respect for the law, legal limitations on lending to government contribute a marginal
negative impact inflation.
4.4  Comparison to Lougani and Sheets   
Recently Lougani and Sheets (1997) examined the relation between the logarithm of inflation
in 1993 and an index of independence they developed for a sample of twelve FSE.  Lougani and Sheets
find a negative relation between those two variables .   Our sample is wider than theirs in terms of26
both countries and time periods covered.  Since we use a number of CBI indices that differ from theirs
it is of some interest to examine the sensitivity of the results they obtain using their sample of countries
with our indices and broader time periods.  This was done by reestimating the equations in tables 3,
4 and 5 of this paper for 9 out of their 12 countries .  Although in all cases the coefficient of27
aggregate legal independence is negative, it is never significant.  When the same experiment is
repeated only for the periods after the enactment of the CB laws for the same nine countries, a few
of the (negative) coefficients of legal independence become significant but most of them remain
insignificant.  The interaction between legal independence and cumulative liberalization is  negative
and significant only in one case -- when the LVES index is used.  
5.  Inflation and legal central bank independence in an international
sample
This section makes a step towards a broader examination of the relation between inflation and
legal independence by examining this relationship in a sample that combines the (up to) three periods
24
Table 6 : Inflation and legal CBI - an international sample  a












Intercept 0.42 0.35 0.27 0.22
                                              (0.00)              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adj. R- sq 0.18 0.08 0.55 0.54
Number of observations   79 73 78 72
_________________
 The international sample includes  most of the developed economies during the eighties and oura
sample of 26 transition economies in the pre and post CB law enactment periods, as well as an "in
between laws period" for transition countries that had two CB law reforms. 
Numbers in parenthesis under the coefficients are levels of significance. 
           
The data on the developed economies is taken from Cukierman , Webb and Neyapti28
(1992).  Although data on CBI in developing countries during the eighties is available we do not
include those countries in the sample since previous studies show that legal independence was a
very poor proxy for actual independence in those countries at that time (Cukierman , Webb and
Neyapti (1992) and chapter 20 of Cukierman (1992)).  Those studies found no relation between
legal independence and inflation in developing countries which led them and others to use
behavioral proxies of independence like CB governors' turnover or a measure of the political
vulnerability of the CB governor in the face of political change (Cukierman and Webb (1995)). 
The development of such measures for the transition countries is beyond the scope of this study.   
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sample of transition economies used in the previous section with data on inflation and CBI within the
developed economies during the 1980's.   This data merging yields a sample of up to 79 observations.28
Two sets of regressions are run.  In the first set inflation is related only to the aggregate indices,
LVAW and LVES, of legal independence without controlling for other variables.  The second set
controls for the effects, in transition economies, of factors like price decontrols, wars and the degree
of sustained liberalization.  Results are summarized in table 6.  
It is apparent from the first two columns of the table that, in the combined sample, legal
independence (whether measured by the broad index LVAW, or the narrow index LVES) has a
negative and highly significant effect on inflation but that the overall goodness of fit is low.  Results
in the presence of additional factors appear in the last two columns.  All variables, including the indices
of legal CBI, have the expected signs and are highly significant.  It is noteworthy that the inclusion of
the controls for the transition countries leads to a substantial increase in the overall goodness of fit
without affecting the significance of the negative impact of CBI on inflation.  Experimentation with
an interaction term between the index of cumulative liberalization and aggregate independence (not
shown) does not yield a significant coefficient for the interaction term, but does yield again a negative
and significant coefficient for the indices of legal independence.  
Interestingly, in all cases the  relationship between inflation and legal independence in the
overall sample is  substantially more significant than in the subsample of developed countries alone.
Thus the addition of new central banks in transition economies to the sample of developed economies
strengthens conventional wisdom according to which higher legal CBI is associated with lower
inflation.  
In summary, the results with the international sample yield further support for the view that,
26
in spite of the fact that legal independence does not always fully translate into actual independence,
it is nonetheless associated with significantly lower inflation. 
6.  Determinants of Legal Independence 
Although all FSE enacted CB laws with relatively high levels of independence some countries
went in this direction more than others.  This section takes a brief look at possible reasons for this
cross country variation in the level of independence.  Eyeballing of the data reveals that many of the
high independence countries have a geographical or cultural closeness to Western Europe and to
Germany in particular (Estonia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania), or have a very recent CB law
(Georgia, Lithuania, Armenia and Moldova).  These observations lead to a number of tentative
hypotheses regarding the factors that are conducive to higher CBI.  First, it is possible that the cultural
impact on countries that are nearer to Western Europe is stronger.  To examine this hypothesis we
regressed the various indices of legal independence on the distance between the capital city of each
of the countries in the sample and Berlin.  
Another possibility is that the formal preconditions for joining the EMU might have induced
the countries on the fast tracks to join the monetary union to grant more independence.  The reason
is that one of the preconditions for joining is, according to the Maastricht Treaty, a sufficiently high
level of CBI.  Poland, Hungary,  Slovenia and the Czech Republic are on the first fast track to join the
EMU and the Slovak Republic, Rumania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia are on a second fast track
to join it. To test for the possible effect, on the choice of legal independence,  of being on either one
of the two fast tracks to join the EMU we added two dummy variables to the regression.  The first
dummy (second) assumes a value of one if the country is on the first (second) fast track to join the
EMU and zero otherwise. 
To test for the possibility that the level of independence granted is higher the later is the time
of reform we also added a regressor that measures the difference between the year of enactment of
the CB law and 1990.  Finally to examine the possibility that countries with stronger inflationary
experiences tend to, subsequently, delegate more authorities to the CB we added the average value
of inflation in the years prior to and including the year of enactment of the CB law to the regressions.
The evidence suggests that being on the first (but not on the second) fast track to join EMU
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has a significant and positive impact on the level of legal independence chosen.  The number of years
that elapsed between the year of enactment of the law and 1990 also has a positive and (for some of
the aggregate legal indices) significant effect on independence. 
Except for the lagged average value of inflation which turned out negative and significant all
the remaining variables above turned out insignificant.  The negative sign of lagged inflation is
obviously inconsistent with the view that the authorities of countries with higher inflation subsequently
delegated more authority to their central banks.  
7.  Concluding Remarks  
This paper develops extensive new data on the legal independence of central banks in the post
CB reform period in the FSE.  The new data is constructed in a manner that makes it comparable to
earlier data on CBI in the industrial democracies and in, non FSE developing countries.  The data
indicates that  CB reform in the FSE during the nineties has been quite ambitious.  In spite of the large
price shocks induced by the transformation from plan to market, or perhaps because of them,
reformers in those countries chose to create central banks with levels of legal independence that are
substantially higher, on average, than those of developed economies.  But since it is likely that the
average level of compliance with the law in the FSE is lower than compliance with it in Western
democracies the discrepancy in actual independence may not be as large as appears to be the case
from this comparison.  
Taken to the extreme, and in view of the large price shocks caused by liberalization, the
preceding observation could lead to the hypothesis that differences in  legal independence among the
different FSE should not matter much for inflation.  The evidence in this paper suggests that such a
conclusion is too extreme.  CBI is indeed unrelated to inflation during the early phases of
liberalization.  But for sufficiently  high and sustained levels of liberalization, and controlling for
variables like wars and price liberalization, legal CBI and inflation are significantly and negatively
related.  These findings are consistent with the view that legal CBI, no matter how high, cannot
contain the powerful inflationary impacts of price decontrols and of the liberalization of foreign trade
and of the exchange rate.  But once the process of liberalization has gone far enough legal
independence turns out to be effective in slowing inflation down.  
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Interestingly,  the cumulative index of liberalization developed by de Melo et. al. (1996) exerts
a significant negative influence on inflation, as is the case in their paper, but only at low levels of
cumulative liberalization.  At high levels of cumulative liberalization, after a sufficiently sustained
experience with the new liberalized institutions has accumulated, CBI becomes relatively more
important in keeping inflation down and cumulative liberalization becomes insignificant. One possible
explanation for the increase in the effectiveness of CBI at high levels of cumulative liberalization is that
law abidance in transition economies rises with the level of cumulative liberalization. As a consequence
the discrepancy between the relatively high legal independence of the central banks of economies in
transition and their actual independence shrinks -- and legal independence becomes more effective in
keeping inflation at bay.  
Examination of the relation between inflation  and legal independence in an international
sample composed of the transition and of the developed economies strengthens the conclusion that
legal independence and inflation are negatively related. 
Eight out of the twenty six FSE in our sample had two CB reforms.  The average level of
independence of the first law in those countries was usually lower than the average level of
independence in countries with only one CB reform.  This was often followed by very high inflation
in the countries with two reforms and then by enactment of a second CB law.  The average level of
independence embodied in the second law is substantially higher than that of the first law in those
countries.  It is also higher than the average level of independence in the 18 countries which had only
one CB reform.
A preliminary examination of the factors that determine the level of legal independence chosen
by political authorities suggests that being on the first fast track to join the EMU has a positive effect
on legal independence, and that the later the year of CB reform the higher the level of independence
embodied in the new charter.  A possible reason is that the importance of CBI as a signal of financial
respectability, to gain access to international credit markets, rose through the nineties with the further
abolition of restrictions on capital flows and further widening of international capital markets.  But the
existing evidence does not support the view that countries with higher inflation subsequently grant
higher independence to the CB.  
The fact that the average level of legal independence of the new central banks of economies
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in transition is substantially higher than that of developed economies during the eighties at least
partially reflects the shift in professional consensus among economists and policymakers in favor of
CBI between those two decades.  Our feeling is that, had CB reform in the transition economies taken
place during the eighties rather than during the nineties, the level of CBI embodied in the new laws
would have been significantly lower.  This is one concrete illustration of the broader principle that
existing professional consensus at the time of reform affects the pattern of reform.  
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Codings of the components of aggregate indices of legal central bank independence
Year of         Policy Formulation
Enactment CEO Who                                Limitations on lending
of Central Term of Who Dis- Other formu- Final Role in Securitized Terms of Potential Type of Maturity Interest Primary 
Country Bank Law office appoints missal offices lates authority budget Objectives Advances lending lending borrowers limit of loans rates market
Albania 1992 0.75 0.75 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 NA 0.60 0.33 0.67 0.33 NA 0.33 1.00 0.75 0.00
Armenia 1993 0.75 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.25 0.00
1996 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00
Azerbaijan 1992 NA 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA NA 1.00 0.25 0.00
1996 0.50 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.67 NA 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
Belarus 1992 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.00
Bulgaria 1991 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 NA NA 0.60 0.67 0.00 0.33 NA 0.33 1.00 0.25 1.00
Croatia 1992 0.75 0.50 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.00 0.67 NA 0.33 0.67 0.25 0.00
Czech Republic 1991 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 0.80 0.67 0.67 0.67 NA 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.00
Estonia 1993 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00
Georgia 1995 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.75 0.00
Hungary 1991 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.67 NA 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.75 0.00
Kazakstan 1993 0.75 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 NA 0.67 0.75 0.00
1995 0.75 0.50 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 NA 0.00 0.75 1.00
Kyrgyz Republic 1992 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 0.40 1.00 0.60 0.33 0.00 0.67 NA 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.00
Latvia 1992 0.75 0.50 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.67 NA 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.00
Lithuania 1991 NA 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
1996 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00
Macedonia 1995 0.75 0.50 0.83 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.75 0.00
Moldova 1991 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
1995 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 NA 1.00 0.75 1.00
Mongolia 1991 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.67 NA NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
1996 0.75 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.25 0.00
Poland 1991 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.33 0.60 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
1997 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Romania 1991 0.00 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.33 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
Russia 1995 0.25 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 0.20 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 0.75 0.00
Slovak Republic 1992 0.75 0.50 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 NA 0.67 0.67 0.00 0.33 1.00 NA 0.00
Slovenia 1991 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 NA 0.80 0.67 0.00 1.00 NA 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00
Tajikistan 1993 NA 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.67 NA 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
Turkmenistan 1992 NA 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
Ukraine 1991 NA 0.50 NA NA 0.67 NA 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Uzbekistan 1992? 0.25 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.67 NA 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.75 1.00
Uzbekistan 1995 0.25 0.50 0.83 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA 1.00 0.75 1.00
Notes:
1. A detailed description of the 16 legal variables in the table appears in table 1 (pp. 358-9) of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, (1992) or Table 19.1 (pp. 373-6) of Cukierman (1992). 
2. Although the 1997 charter of the Bank of Poland does not contain any reference to limitations on lending to government we assigned the maximum value of 1.00 to all the limitations
 on lending variables for Poland in 1997.  The reason is that article 220 - 2 in the chapter on Public Finances (ch. X) of the April, 2, 1997 constitution of the Republic of Poland 
states that; "The budget shall not provide for covering a budget deficit by way of contracting credit obligations to the State's central bank".   
Table A2: Yearly Inflation Rates and Rates of Depreciation in the Real Value of Money (D), 1989-98
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Inflation --  period averages: D
Albania 0 0 36 226 85 23 7.8 12.7 32.1 20.6 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.69 0.46 0.19 0.07 0.11 0.24 0.17
Armenia 0 10.3 100 1346 3500 5273 176.7 18.7 14 6.7 0.00 0.09 0.50 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.64 0.16 0.12 0.06
Azerbaijan 0 7.8 107 912 1129 1664 411.7 19.7 8.4 -0.8 0.00 0.07 0.52 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.80 0.16 0.08 -0.01
Belarus 1.7 4.5 83.5 971 1187 2200 709.3 53 63.9 77 0.02 0.04 0.46 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.35 0.39 0.44
Bulgaria 6 22 333.5 82 73 96.3 62.1 123 1082 22 0.06 0.18 0.77 0.45 0.42 0.49 0.38 0.55 0.92 0.18
Croatia 2520.5 135.6 123 665.5 1517.5 97.6 2 3.5 3.6 5.7 0.96 0.58 0.55 0.87 0.94 0.49 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05
Czech Rep. 2.3 10.8 56.6 11.1 20.8 10 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 0.02 0.10 0.36 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
Estonia 6.1 23 210.5 1076 89.8 48 29 23 11 10.6 0.06 0.19 0.68 0.91 0.47 0.32 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.10
Georgia 0 3.3 79 887 3125 15607 162.7 39.4 7.3 3.7 0.00 0.03 0.44 0.90 0.97 0.99 0.62 0.28 0.07 0.04
Hungary 17 28.9 35 23 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 0.15 0.22 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.13
Kazakstan 0 4.2 79 1381 1662 1892 176 39.1 17.4 7.3 0.00 0.04 0.44 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.64 0.28 0.15 0.07
Kyrgyz Rep. 0 3 85 855 772 229 52.5 30.4 25.5 13 0.00 0.03 0.46 0.90 0.89 0.70 0.34 0.23 0.20 0.12
Latvia 4.7 10.5 172 951 108 36 25 17.6 8.4 4.7 0.04 0.10 0.63 0.90 0.52 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.04
Lithuania 2.1 8.4 224.7 1020.5 410.4 72.1 39.5 24.7 8.9 5.1 0.02 0.08 0.69 0.91 0.80 0.42 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.05
Macedonia 1246 120.5 229.7 1664.4 338.4 126.5 16.4 2.5 1.8 0.6 0.93 0.55 0.70 0.94 0.77 0.56 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.01
Moldova 0 4.2 98 1276.4 788.5 330 30 23.5 11.8 8 0.00 0.04 0.49 0.93 0.89 0.77 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.07
Mongolia 0 0 208.6 321 183 145 56.8 na na na 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.76 0.65 0.59 0.36 na na na
Poland 251 585.8 70.3 43 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.8 0.72 0.85 0.41 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.11
Romania 1.1 5.1 161 210.4 256 136.7 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.2 0.01 0.05 0.62 0.68 0.72 0.58 0.24 0.28 0.61 0.37
Russia 2.2 5.6 93 1526 875 311.4 197.7 47.7 14.7 27.8 0.02 0.05 0.48 0.94 0.90 0.76 0.66 0.32 0.13 0.22
Slovak Rep. 0 10.8 61.2 10.1 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 0.00 0.10 0.38 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06
Slovenia 1306 550 117.7 207.3 32.9 21 13.5 9.9 8.4 8 0.93 0.85 0.54 0.67 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07
Tajikistan 0 4 112 1157 2195 350 609 418 87.8 43.1 0.00 0.04 0.53 0.92 0.96 0.78 0.86 0.81 0.47 0.30
Turkmenistan 2.1 4.6 103 492.9 3102 1748 1005 992 83.7 17 0.02 0.04 0.51 0.83 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.46 0.15
Ukraine 2 4 91 1210 4735 891 377 80 16 11 0.02 0.04 0.48 0.92 0.98 0.90 0.79 0.44 0.14 0.10
Uzbekistan 0.7 3.1 82.2 645 534 1568 305 54 72 34 0.01 0.03 0.45 0.87 0.84 0.94 0.75 0.35 0.42 0.25
SOURCES: 1. EBRD, Transition Report Update 1999.
2. de Melo et al. (1996).
D is the rate of depreciation in the real value of money.  It is calculated from the relation D=F/(1+F) where F is the yearly rate of inflation.
The inflation data from 1992 and on is from the 1999 EBRD Transition Report Update (the figures for 1998 are estimates as of July 1999).
The data for 1989 and 1990 are from de Melo et al.  Except for Armenia, Belarus and FYR Macedonia, whose data are from de Melo et al., the data for 1991 are from the EBRD (1999).
Except for Armenia, Belarus and FYR Macedonia, whose data are from de Melo et al., the data for 1991 are from the 1999 EBRD Transition Report Update.
Data for Mongolia for all years are from de Melo et al.
Table A3: Cumulative Liberalization Index, CLI (*)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Albania 0 0 0.24 0.9 1.6 2.3 3.04 3.78 4.56
Armenia 0.04 0.08 0.21 0.6 1.02 1.44 1.93 2.65 3.37
Azerbaijan 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.37 0.68 1.03 1.47 2.02 2.64
Belarus 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.38 0.71 1.07 1.55 2.03 2.54
Bulgaria 0.13 0.32 0.94 1.6 2.26 2.9 3.48 4.13 4.92
Croatia 0.41 1.03 1.65 2.37 3.16 3.98 4.83 5.68 6.53
Czech Republic 0 0.16 0.95 1.84 2.74 3.64 4.57 5.5 6.43
Estonia 0.07 0.27 0.59 1.23 2.04 2.93 3.86 4.79 5.72
Georgia 0.04 0.08 0.3 0.62 0.97 1.36 1.85 2.54 3.26
Hungary 0.34 0.91 1.65 2.43 3.25 4.11 5.01 5.91 6.84
Kazakstan 0.04 0.08 0.22 0.57 0.92 1.31 1.92 2.64 3.39
Kyrgyz Republic 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.45 1.05 1.81 2.63 3.49 4.35
Latvia 0.04 0.17 0.46 0.97 1.64 2.45 3.26 4.11 5
Lithuania 0.04 0.17 0.5 1.05 1.83 2.72 3.61 4.5 5.39
Macedonia 0.41 1.03 1.68 2.36 3.14 3.92 4.7 5.52 6.34
Moldova 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.56 1.07 1.62 2.3 3.05 3.8
Mongolia 0 0 0.44 0.99 1.6 2.27 2.94 3.61 4.44
Poland 0.24 0.92 1.64 2.46 3.28 4.14 5.03 5.92 6.81
Romania 0 0.22 0.58 1.03 1.61 2.29 3 3.72 4.47
Russia 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.67 1.26 1.92 2.69 3.49 4.32
Slovak Republic 0 0.16 0.95 1.81 2.64 3.47 4.33 5.19 6.05
Slovenia 0.41 1.03 1.74 2.52 3.34 4.16 5.01 5.88 6.77
Tajikistan 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.39 0.65 0.95 1.34 1.76 2.21
Turkmenistan 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.25 0.41 0.63 0.85 1.17 1.53
Ukraine 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.41 0.54 0.8 1.31 1.9 2.55
Uzbekistan 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.38 0.68 1.11 1.69 2.26 2.83
(*)  CLI is composed of the cumulative degrees of liberalization in internal and external markets and private
sector entry, with weights of 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4, respectively.
Sources: Till 1995: de Melo et al.(1996); 1996-97: update provided by Cevdet Denizer, World Bank, in July 1999.
Table A4: Panel Data for 3 Subperiods
PERIOD D LVAW LVES LVESX CLI WD I I1
Albania 1 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.20
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.21 0.51 0.47 0.49 3.41 0.00 0.90 0.96
Armenia 1 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.20 0.40
2 0.59 0.30 0.60 0.34 2.02 1.00 0.70 0.86
3 0.09 0.85 1.00 0.90 3.37 0.00 0.80 0.91
Azerbaijan 1 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 1.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.64 0.22 NA 0.42 1.25 1.00 0.70 0.86
3 0.03 0.25 NA 0.32 2.64 0.00 0.80 0.91
Belarus 1 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.20 0.40
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.38 2.54 0.00 0.80 0.91
Bulgaria 1 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.48 0.55 NA 0.65 3.48 0.00 0.60 0.80
Croatia 1 0.74 0.15 0.16 0.13 1.34 1.00 0.70 0.86
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.26 0.44 0.60 0.49 4.41 1.00 0.90 0.96
Czech Republic 1 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.10 0.73 0.96 0.73 4.57 0.00 0.90 0.96
Estonia 1 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.50 0.72
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.31 0.78 0.96 0.58 4.79 0.00 0.90 0.96
Georgia 1 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 1.00 0.50 0.72
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.13 0.73 0.68 0.62 3.26 0.00 0.80 0.91
Hungary 1 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.39 0.91 0.00 0.80 0.91
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.17 0.67 0.79 0.61 5.01 0.00 0.90 0.96
Kazakstan 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.23
2 0.79 0.32 0.63 0.56 1.60 0.00 0.65 0.82
3 0.17 0.44 0.92 0.79 3.39 0.00 0.80 0.91
Kyrgyz Republic 1 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.32 0.52 0.55 0.55 3.49 0.00 0.80 0.91
Latvia 1 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.40 0.63
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.21 0.49 0.96 0.73 3.69 0.00 0.90 0.96
Lithuania 1 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.40 0.63
2 0.52 0.28 0.37 0.25 3.17 0.00 0.90 0.96
3 0.07 0.78 0.96 0.58 5.39 0.00 0.90 0.96
Macedonia 1 0.65 0.15 0.16 0.13 2.36 0.00 0.80 0.91
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.02 0.41 0.68 0.55 6.34 0.00 0.90 0.96
Moldova 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.10 0.23
2 0.50 0.38 0.84 0.54 3.05 1.00 0.80 0.91
3 0.12 0.73 0.96 0.94 3.80 0.00 0.80 0.91
Mongolia 1 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PERIOD D LVAW LVES LVESX CLI WD I I1
2 NA 0.43 0.96 0.61 2.27 0.00 0.70 0.86
3 na 0.55 0.92 0.68 4.44 0.00 0.80 0.91
Poland 1 0.66 0.10 0.27 0.19 0.92 0.00 0.70 0.86
2 0.22 0.46 0.49 0.32 4.59 0.00 0.90 0.96
3 0.11 0.89 0.92 0.75 NA 0.00 NA NA
Romania 1 0.23 0.23 0.76 0.76 0.22 0.00 0.50 0.72
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.50 0.34 0.51 0.32 3.00 0.00 0.80 0.91
Russia 1 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.60 0.80
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.22 0.49 0.47 0.38 4.32 0.00 0.80 0.91
Slovak Republic 1 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.45 0.48
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.10 0.62 0.92 0.73 4.76 0.00 0.90 0.96
Slovenia 1 0.77 0.15 0.16 0.13 1.03 1.00 0.70 0.86
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.21 0.63 0.72 0.52 5.01 0.00 0.90 0.96
Tajikistan 1 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 1.00 0.40 0.23
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.53 0.36 NA 0.29 2.21 1.00 0.70 0.80
Turkmenistan 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.67 0.26 0.25 0.19 1.17 0.00 0.50 0.72
Ukraine 1 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.23
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.47 0.42 NA NA 1.90 0.00 0.70 0.86
Uzbekistan 1 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.75 0.41 NA 0.71 1.69 0.00 0.70 0.86
3 0.34 0.56 0.92 0.92 2.83 0.00 0.60 0.80
Notes: 
a. Period 1 starts in 1989.  For non former Soviet Union countries it ends in the year of
enactment of the first central bank law. For former Soviet Union countries the last year
of period 1 is the latest of the year of enactment of the first central bank law and of the.
year of replacement of the Ruble by a domestic currency.
Period 2 is the period after the enactment of the first central bank law including the year of 
enactment of the second central bank law, if there is such a law.
Period 3 covers all the years following the enactment of the last central bank law, up to and
including 1998.
b. D is the average rate of depreciation in the real value of money within each subperiod.
c. CLI is the value of the cumulative liberalization index in the middle of each subperiod.  
If the number of years in a subperiod is odd, CLI is the value at the median year in that
subperiod.  If the number of years in a subperiod is even, CLI is the average of the values
in the two middle years.
Since the data for 1998 is unavailable, CLI for the third period of countries whose CB
enactment year was 1996 (Armenia, Azarbaijan,Lithuania and Mongolia) is the value
of CLI in 1997.
d. WD is a war dummy which assumes a value of one in periods (1, 2 or 3) in which the country
was at war for more than half of the period, and zero otherwise.
e. I is the value of the de Melo et. al. (1996) index of liberalization of internal prices in the median
year(s) of each subperiod.  
f. I1 is a concave transformation of I that has the same mean value and the same slope as I 
at the mean value of I.  The precise form of the transformation appears in footnote 25.
